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Abstract  
From 2002 to 2012, 68 community consultations/referenda on large-scale mining activities have 
been conducted in Latin America challenging centralized decision-making procedures. These 
community consultations are not fostered by national governments or mining companies. Around 
700.000 people have participated, expressing a massive rejection of mining activities in Peru, 
Guatemala, Argentina, Colombia and Ecuador. Community consultations have contributed to 
ease local tensions temporarily, slowing down or stopping mining projects in some cases. This 
paper analyses the process of emergence and spread of such consultations exploring how they 
challenge the governance of mining activities. 
We claim that community consultations are been institutionalised in the context of mining 
conflicts in Latin America. Consultations are not isolated experiences but constitute a strategy 
diffused and transformed through anti-mining networks with the support, in most cases, of local 
governments. Consultations diffuse in the midst of multi-scalar social learning processes where 
social movements exchange strategies and discourses and a hybridising process occurs in relation 
to political and cultural local features. We sustain that community consultations are a hybrid 
institution, the product of a dynamic multi-scalar process where non-State and State actors, 
formal and informal institutions are mobilized to challenge the centralized governance of 
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extractive industries. Consultations are a strategic tool of social movements and an emergent 
participation institution that reclaims the right of affected populations and indigenous peoples to 
participate, in empowering forms, in high stake decisions that affect their territories, livelihoods 
and future. 
Key Words: mining consultation, environmental governance, hybrid institutions, social movements, 
diffusion, Latin America. 
1. Introduction 
On the first Sunday of June 2002, 75% of the eligible voters of the Peruvian district of 
Tambogrande rejected the exploitation of a large-scale open-pit gold mine. From 2002 to 
2012, 68 consultations/referenda have been conducted in 5 Latin American (LA) countries, 
with a large opposition to mining projects. This process is occurring in a context of growing 
pressures to extract mineral ores in LA and an increasing number of related socio-
environmental conflicts (Muradian et al, 2012). These community consultations are not 
commissioned by national governments or mining companies as part of official procedures 
but instead are promoted by social movements and usually supported by local governments.  
The emergence and spread of consultations in LA remains poorly studied as a whole. 
Studies addressing mining consultations/referenda have focused on the first four cases 
(Tambogrande, Esquel, Sipakapa and Majaz/Río Blanco) along with the wave of 
consultations in Guatemala. Nevertheless, the cases that followed, and the connections 
among consultations have received poor scholarly attention.  
This paper is the result of a macro-analysis of the 68 mining consultations identified in Latin 
America between 2002 and 2012. It examines a salient issue in current Latin American 
politics, by comparing and exploring the connections between consultation experiences. We 
analyse the contested institutionalisation of consultations in the context of mining conflicts 
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in Latin America. Moreover we point to the association of local governments and civil 
society actors and the hybridation of formal and informal mechanisms in these processes.  
The authors of this paper were among the researchers that analysed the initial cases of 
consultation and have since then seen how year after year the number of communities 
participating in almost identical experiences increased. This research is born from the 
curiosity of understanding how and why these consultations have emerged and spread and 
how community consultations are challenging the governance of mining activities.  
2. Community consultations and the contested governance of mining activities in Latin 
America 
Researches on cases where community consultations were conducted focused on the 
contexts, actors, grievances, narratives, scalar dynamics and outcomes of the conflicts 
(Rash, 2012; Yagenova and Garcia, 2009, Haarstad and Floysand, 2007; Urkidi and Walter, 
2011, Urkidi, 2011, Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2010, Dougherty and Olsen, 2014; 
Muradian et al, 2003, Van de Sandt, 2009; Bebbington, 2012a, Holden and Jacobson 2008; 
Bebbington, 2012a) rather than the consulting process itself, that is, in general, blurred.  
Studies conducted, mainly, on the experiences of Guatemala and Peru, have also addressed 
consultations mechanisms and rights, analysing the impact of mining projects on human 
rights and the legitimacy of corporate responsibility (Coumans, 2012, Laplante and Nolin, 
2014); the legal grounds and implications of consultations regarding the right to free, prior, 
and informed consent (Loarca, 2008, Fulmer, 2011, Fulmer et al, 2008, Ward, 2011, McGee, 
2009); the judicialization of protests in cases of consultations (Sieder, 2011); and the 
relevance of consultations for indigenous mobilizations and identity reconstruction (Fulmer, 
2011, Rash, 2012). There is also a relevant literature that systematizes the consultation 
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experiences in Huehuetenango, Guatemala (e.g. Merida and Krenmayr, 2009, Trentavici and 
Cahuec, 2012).  
We highlight two key contributions of this paper to the literature. Firstly, researches on 
community mining consultations have, with few exceptions (e.g. Fulmer, 2011) focused on 
single case or single country level analysis. While such approaches have provided an in-
depth understanding of the studied cases, there has been no study tackling the phenomenon 
from a regional perspective. This paper adopts a multi-case regional approach that aims to 
explore the connections and compare the features of consultation experiences. In this vein, 
we aim to tackle the spatial and scalar dynamics at stake, pointing to the complexity of the 
institutionalization process of consultations in Latin America.  
Secondly, previous research refer to community consultations as “informal” events 
organized by civil society actors or examine consultations from a legalistic approach 
analysing how consultations followed legal requirements. These approaches have 
overlooked the role that local governments are playing in the organization and formal 
support of these mechanisms, as well as the on-going process of institutionalization 
addressed in this paper. These features of consultations trigger relevant questions regarding 
the association of local governments and civil society actors, as well as the combination of 
formal and informal institutional elements in consultations.  
2.1. The regulatory context in the governance of extractive activities 
The key features of the institutions that regulate mining activities are shared by most LA 
countries. LA mining laws were developed under similar guidelines (Bridge, 2004, 
Chaparro, 2002). The approval of mining projects is usually centralized in the national 
government, and is based on the assessment of an environmental impact report. Participation 
arenas are set in relation to this technical document. Civil society actors can usually present 
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non-binding allegations and, sometimes, can express their views in a public audience where 
the technical document is presented and discussed.  
In 2007, in the midst of Majaz conflict, the Ombudsman of Peru issued a special report 
identifying key reasons behind the increased number of extractive environmental conflicts in 
the country. For instance, the poor performance of the Peruvian State regarding participation 
mechanisms (e.g. shortening the time frame of civil society actors to present allegations to 
EIAs or the lack of responses to the allegations presented). A situation that “feeds the 
perception of citizens that the possibility to participate in the environmental assessment of 
projects (…) is irrelevant (…) a mere formalism within an administrative procedure” (own 
translation) (Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú, 2007: 31). A report published by the Latin 
American Observatory of Mining Conflicts in 2010 on participation and consultation rights 
claimed that participation in mining decisions is mainly “informative” and insufficient, 
when not secretive (Jahncke and Meza, 2010). 
Large scale projects affecting indigenous communities are under specific regulations. Most 
LA countries – all countries studied in this paper – have subscribed to the International 
Labour Organization Convention 169 (ILO 169), which requires governments to ensure 
prior and informed consent of communities before decisions that could affect them are 
made; a process that should follow customary procedures. Social movements claim that this 
right is usually ignored or miss-applied (Jahncke and Meza, 2010). However, even if put in 
practice, the way ILO 169 and other international documents (e.g. UN declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People) frame “consent” is ambiguous and does not necessarily imply 
a binding power to community views (McGee, 2009, Jahncke and Meza, 2010, Rodriguez 
Garavito et al, 2010). States usually refer to “consulta previa” as a process of consultation 
that does not acknowledge the need to gain consent of affected populations (Rodriguez 
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Garavito et al, 2010). How consent is defined and to which extent it is included in national 
legislations is currently under debate in many Latin American countries.  
Decentralization policies adopted by Latin American countries since the end of 1980s have 
also opened new spaces for local participation and municipal empowerment and are shaping 
the contested terrain of mining governance. National and local rights (e.g. information 
access, local participation mechanisms) and mechanisms of semi-direct democracy (e.g. 
citizen referendum, citizens initiative law) were introduced. Most Latin American countries 
fostered decentralization measures granting greater autonomy to the municipalities. For 
instance, Latin American Municipalities could, in countries like Guatemala, Peru and 
Argentina call for a local consultation on specific administrative decisions affecting their 
inhabitants (e.g. Guatemala Municipal Code, 2002:20). Despite the possible asymmetric 
negotiations between local governments and companies fostered by decentralisation policies 
(Rull, 2007), these regulations have also created new political opportunities as civil society 
demand the local level as a legitimate arena for participation and decision-making. 
In the midst of these different institutional frameworks, community consultations are being 
fostered by social movements and organizations that ask for a greater inclusion of affected 
populations in the governance of mining activities.  
 
2.2 Environmental governance and social movements: hybrid institutions and diffusion 
There is an ongoing shift in views that frame resource regulation from those that are led by 
State-based institutions of resource management (government) to a wider environmental 
governance perspective (Bakker and Bridge, 2008). The governance approach addresses the 
myriad of actors and institutions that guide the ways in which environmental issues are 
addressed across different scales (Bulkeley, 2005). Hybrid forms of governance challenge 
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the conventionally recognized social roles of markets, States and, more recently, 
communities, as new dynamics and alliances are formed. This framework offers a relevant 
approach to examine how civil society actors and local governments are shaping 
consultations as an emerging governance mechanism. 
We refer to hybrid governance as a process of institutional bricolage where different (non-
State and State) actors shape institutions that combine formal and informal components in a 
multi-scalar dynamic. Cleaver (2001, 2002, 2013) developed the concept of “institutional 
bricolage” as a process by which people consciously and unconsciously draw on existing 
social and cultural arrangements (rules, traditions, norms, roles and relationships) to patch 
together institutions in response to changing situations (Cleaver et al, 2013). In this 
dynamic, the resulting institution is a mix of modern and traditional, of formal and informal 
practices that make sense in each particular place. A similar process is identified in the case 
of community-led consultations, where formal and informal institutions, local and 
international rights and regulations and locally legitimized procedures come together.  
Studies on the role of social movements in institutional change offer relevant insights. In 
their review of the synergies between social movement theory and neo-institutionalism, 
Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) identify two key areas of research: social movements 
studied as outsiders and challengers of institutions, and social movements performing within 
institutions. In many cases, social movements instigate shocks or motivations or oppose 
directly existing schemes, generating legitimacy crises or otherwise disrupting institutions. 
However, they sometimes promote path creation and change by engaging in institutional 
processes and combining new projects or practices with prevailing models and arrangements 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008:653).  
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In the case of consultations, anti-mining movements are challenging centralized decision-
making governing mining activities pushing institutional change. However, they are also 
partially basing their strategy in formal institution resources, such as laws and rights from 
different scales and promoting new institutional arrangements with local governments.  
According to the two stage model of institutionalization summarised by Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury (2008:651) the emergence of new paths is a ‘bottom up’ phenomenon where 
organizations or States adopt structures or policies in response to local problems, which then 
spark processes of mimesis, theorization and diffusion and become taken-for-granted as an 
accepted norm. We sustain that the emergence and spread of consultations can be seen as 
following this process of institutionalization in the context of mining conflicts. However, we 
acknowledge that this institutionalization process is contested as different areas of the State 
support or reject the validity of consultations.  
Indeed, social movements might use the material and cultural resources of an institution as a 
base from which to challenge other institutions (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008:86-87). The 
multi-level or federated character of institutions creates, sometimes, opportunities for 
movements (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008). In this sense, it is important to analyse the 
scalar and spatial dynamics in processes of institutionalization.  
In the context of political transfer, Peck (2011) points out that policies or political strategies 
are not merely transferred over space; their form and their effects are transformed by these 
journeys. More than policy or political transfers, he identifies context-dependent mobility-
and-mutation processes (Peck, 2011).  
Similarly, scholars and participants of contentious politics have examined how social 
movements (or some element thereof, such a tactic, symbol, frame, outcome, issue) spread 
or diffuse from one place to another (Givan et al, 2010). Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) 
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argue that diffusion processes have been usually understood as “deterritorialized” flows of 
information, while diffusion involves much creative reinvention and pragmatist agency 
(Chabot and Duyvendak, 2002:707). Indeed, diffusion is often a highly social or relational 
process (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005:129), where repertories or frames are transmitted 
through interpersonal contacts, organisational linkages or associational networks, and 
involves the interaction between formal and informal institutions (Givan et al, 2010:2). 
Diffusion, then, does not simply mean that tactics or frames are transplanted form one site to 
other as a matter of political contagion or imitation; creative borrowing, adaptation, and 
political learning are often vital to its success (Givan et al , 2010:2). As we analyse in this 
paper, these are key insights to understand the emergence and spread of consultation in Latin 
American mining conflicts. 
 
3. Methods and sources 
In order to study the process of emergence and spread of LA mining consultations, the 
authors of this paper identified and analysed all cases of metal-mining 
consultations/referenda from 2002 to 2012 in LA. We considered those 
consultation/referenda that were not fostered by the central government or private 
companies as part of an official consultation process, and aimed at consulting the local 
citizens at large whether or not a community/municipality/district was in favour of large-
scale metal mining activities in their territory.  
We analysed for each case the context in which consultations were conducted, the 
characteristics, claims and scalar features of the actors that promoted or impeded 
consultations, the regulations used to support consultations/referenda, the consultation main 
characteristics, outcomes and reactions, and the connections between cases.  
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The research was conducted reviewing and triangulating primary and secondary, activist and 
academic sources. Our methodology is based on Gerber (2011) multiple case analysis of 
conflicts over plantations. We conducted a review of the main newspapers for each LA 
country. International and LA activist networks and websites on mining conflicts were a key 
source of information as these networks reach a wide range of social movements in the 
region that don’t always get media (or scholarly) attention (e.g. www.conflictosmineros.net, 
www.noalamina.org, www.minesandcommunities.org). These networks have been 
increasingly recognized as relevant for research, not only as a source of activist knowledge 
(Rocheleau et al, 1996, Escobar, 2008, Gerber 2011, Martinez-Alier et al, 2011), but also for 
the development of extractive industries research in LA (Bebbington, 2012b). We also 
reviewed activist’ and scholar’ analyses of mining conflicts, as well as documentaries 
addressing our case studies.  
Primary sources were also used. The authors of this paper had previously carried out 
extensive field work in two main consultation cases (Esquel and Sipakapa) and in other 
mining conflicts in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia. When required to fill blanks or 
contrast the quality of information, activists and scholars were interviewed. Sources were 
compiled and compared, identifying and choosing the best quality information available and 
developing a series of hypotheses that made us revisit and expand our sources in an iterative 
research process.  
 
4. The rise and spread of mining consultations in Latin America  
We identified 68 metal mining consultations in 5 LA countries for the period 2002-2012: 
Peru (2002, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012), Argentina (2003, 2012), Ecuador (2011), Colombia 
(2009) and Guatemala (57 municipal consultations from Sipakapa in 2005 to 
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Mataquescuintla in 2012). We grouped cases in three main paths according to their 
connections, not their chronological order. In this vein, we aim to identify how consultations 
experiences have been shared from conflict to conflict as a useful participation institution. 
For each path, we highlight the key elements of the leading case(s), identify how 
consultations emerged, their institutional features and the actors involved, and the multiple 
processes at play in the spread of consultation cases.  
Table 1 presents the cases of consultations conducted in the context of active mining 
conflicts in Latin America from 2002 to 2012. Table 2 refers to the wave of consultations 
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Tambogrande project. Manhattan 
Minerals (Junior Canada). Gold and 
silver 
S Y Local consultation (M.O.) 27015 (69%) 93.85% 1.98 4.17 
Majaz/Río Blanco case. Ayabaca and 
Pacaipampa district (Ayabaca Mun.) & 
Carmen de la Frontera district 




Majaz project. Monterrico  Metals 
(UK, junior). Sold in 2007 to Zijin 





Pacaipampa (local consultation, M.O.)  6091 (71.47%) 
17'033 (94.54) 285 (1.58%) 699 
Ayabaca (local consultation, M.O.)  8873 (50.09%) 
Carmen de la frontera (local 
consultation, M.O.)  
3053(59.26%) 
Candarave case. Districts of Candarave, 
San Pedro, Cairani, Calacala; Talaca, 





Toquepala project. Souther Copper 
Corp. (U.S.- Mexico) copper, 
molybdenum 
S Y Local consultation (M.O.)  3478 (67%) 3215 (92%) n.i. n.i. 
Islay/Tía María case. Districts of 
Cocachacra, Punta de Bombón, Dean 
Valdivia,Mejía, islay-Matarani and 




Tía María project. Souther Copper 
Corp. copper. 
S Y Cocachacra* (local consultation ,M.O.)  3131 (49%) 2916 (93%) 139 (4.4%) 76 (2.4%) 
S Y 
Punta Bombón*(local consultation, 
M.O.) 
2004 (43%) 1883 (94%) 71 (3.5%) 50 (2.5%) 
S Y 
Dean Valdivia (local consultation, 
M.O.) 
2304 (53%) 2211 (96%) 52(2.3%) 41(1.8%) 
S N Mollendo (popular consultation)  3643 (n.i.) 3573 (98%) 9 (0.3%) 61 (1.7%) 
S ** Mejía (local consultation) 272 (n.i.) 245 (90%) 26 (9.8%) 1 (0.4%) 
S N Islay-Matarani (popular consultation) 837 (n.i.) 765 (91.4%) 61 (7.3%) 11 (1.3%) 
Kañaris case. 3 districts (San Juan 





Cañariaco project. Candente Copper 
(Canada, junior) copper, gold, silver 














Esquel project. Meridian Gold (U.S., 
junior)- Sold in 2007 toYamana Gold 
(Canda, Junior) gold, silver 
S Y 
Compulsory popular consultation 
(M.O.) 
13845(75%) 11046(81%) 2561 (17%) 277 (2%) 




Lonco project. Corporación Minera 
de Neuquén (provincial Argentina) 
and Metallurgical Construction Corp 
(China). copper, Molybdenum 
S Y 
Compulsory and Binding Referendum 
(to approve M.O.) 








Quimsacocha project. (Vitoria del 




Project Quimsacocha. Iam Gold 
(Canada). Sold in 2012 to INV 
Metals (Canada, junior) gold, silver, 
copper 
S N 
Communitarian consultation conducted 
by Juntas de Agua to its members. 









Mandé Norte Project. 2 Municipalities 




Mandé Norte Project. Muriel Mining 
(U.S., Junior) copper, gold, 
molybdenum. 














Marlin project. Montana Exploradora 







Y Communitaran consultation (M.O.) 2564 (45%) 95.50% 1.40% 1.60% 
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Notes: * In these consultations two questions were made. We only present in this table the answer regarding acceptance or rejection to mining activities. ** there is divergent information among sources regarding the 
role of the local government in this consultation








Escobal project Oasis (Minera San 
Rafael: Tahoe Resources Canada - 





10,375(53%) 97% 1.6% 1.8% 
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Exploitation in San Miguel 
Ixtahuacan and Sipakapa 
(Goldcorp-Canada: gold, silver, 
others). Exploration licences in 
every municipality with 
consultation (Goldcorp's 
subsidiaries-Canada: gold, 
silver, nickel, cobalt, 
polymetallics, rare earths, 
others) 
11 
Sipakapa 18/05/2005, Comitancillo 
18/06/2005, Concepción Tutuapa 
13/02/2007, Ixchiguan 13/06/2007, Sibinal 
18/04/2008, Comitancillo 14/05/2008, 
Tacaná 16/05/2008, Tajumulco 
13/06/2008, San José Ojetenam 
11/07/2008, Tejutla 30/09/2008, San 






169 and Municipal 
Code. Non-secret 




in the others all the 
community. 






























(Sipakapa and San 
Rafael)                       
Huehueten
ango 
Exploration licences in almost 
every municipality with 
consultation (Goldcorp's 
subsidiaries -Canada- and 
Tenango S.A.-Canada: gold, 
silver, others; Guatemala 
Copper: copper/cobalt; Minas de 
Guatemala: polymetallics; other 
companies). Little lead/zinc 
mines. 
28 
Concepción Huista, Todos Santos 
Cuchumatán, San Juan Atitán, 
Colotenango, Santiago Chimaltenango 25-
27/07/2006, Santa Eulalia 30/08/2006, San 
Pedro Necta 30/03/2007, San Antonio 
Huista 12/05/2007, Santa Cruz Barillas 
23/06/2007, San Ildefonso Ixtahuacán 
03/08/2007, Nentón 11/08/2007, San 
Sebastián Huehuet. 26/10/2007, San 
Miguel Acatán 01/12/2007, San Juan 
Ixcoy 13/05/2008, Tectitán 27/06/2008, 
Chiantla 13/07/2008, Jacaltenango 
26/07/2008, Santa Ana Huista 06/08/2008, 
Aguacatán 03/10/2008, San Pedro Soloma 
17/10/2008, Cuilco 25/10/2008, Santa 
Bárbara 28/11/2008, San Rafael Petzal 
10/01/2009, San Rafael La Indep. 
28/04/2009, San Mateo Ixtatán 
21/05/2009, San Gaspar Ixchil 
23/07/2009, San Sebastián Coatán 










169 and Municipal 
Code. Non-secret 
vote. In 6 of them 
just registered 
people could 
participate, in the 




Some exploration licences 
(Nichromet Guatemala-Canada: 
nickel, cobalt, others). 
5 
Cunén 27/10/2009, Santa Cruz del Quiché 
22/10/2010, Uspantán 29/10/2010, 








169 and Municipal 
Code. Non-secret 




Some exploration licences 
(Goldcorp's subsidiary -Canada: 
gold, silver, zinc; other 
companies). 
8 
Cajola 01/07/2011, San Miguel Siguilá 
15/05/2011, Concepción Chiquirichapa 
20/04/2011, San Martin Chile Verde 
16/03/2011, Olintepeque 20/02/2011, San 










169 and Municipal 





Exploration licences (Tahoe 
Resources -Canada/USA: silver, 
gold, others - Escobal project) 
3 
Nueva Santa Rosa 29/05/2011, Santa Rosa 
de Lima 10/07/2011, Casillas 10/07/2011 










Exploration licences (Mayan 
Iron Corp's subsidiary -
Australia: iron sands, nickel, 
cobalt, rare earths, others). 
Recognition licence (G4G 
Resources -Canada: iron sands) 
1 Champerico 12/02/2012 16.699 people 99% 
Municipal 
Consultation. 
Secret vote. Under 
Municipal Code. 
Jalapa 
Exploration licences (Tahoe 
Resources Canada-USA: silver, 
gold, others: Escobal project; 
Goldcorp: gold, silver, others) 
1 Mataquescuintla 11/11/2012 10.375 people 97% 
Municipal 
Consultation. 
Secret vote. Under 
Municipal Code. 
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4.1 Emergence and spread in Peru and Ecuador 
4.1.1 Tambogrande conflict (Piura)  
Tambogrande is located in one of the poorest departments of Peru (Piura), with an arid 
climate that requires dams and irrigation canals (built with World Bank support) to sustain 
its agricultural export-oriented activities. The conflict was triggered by the Manhattan 
Minerals project, whose main deposit was located under the town of Tambogrande. Critical 
voices pointing to the environmental and social impacts of this activity, led by a local farmer 
and agrarian engineer who had emigrated from Lima, fostered the formation of the Frente de 
Defensa de Tambogrande y el Valle de San Lorenzo in 1999. This organization became the 
main local opposition to the project in collaboration with the local Church and 
CONACAMI, the National Coordinating Confederation of Communities Affected by 
Mining (Portugal Mendoza, 2005). Activists from the Frente framed themselves as 
“agriculturalists”, considering agriculture more than an economic activity, a feature 
constituting their identity (Haarstad and Floysand, 2007:298-9). 
As the Frente was unable to engage in an exchange of views and concerns with the national 
government, local unrest rose (Portugal Mendoza, 2005). In March 2001, after a period of 
strikes, massive mobilisations and violent events in Tambogrande, the local leader 
Godofredo García Baca was shot dead by a hooded gunman (Muradian et al, 2003). These 
events made the mining conflict nationally and internationally known (The Economist, 23 
June 2001), thereby engaging new national and international technical and social supports 
(Bebbington et al, 2011).  
Local tension was growing and social movements became concerned with a possible 
escalation of violence (Portugal Mendoza, 2005, McGee, 2008, Cabellos and Boyd, 2007). 
In this context, the Frente, its allies and Tambogrande’s mayor – who was not clearly 
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positioned before – agreed on the need to conduct a consulta vecinal (neighbours’ 
consultation)  (Portugal Mendoza, 2005, Bebbington et al, 2011, Subies et al, 2005). 
The Municipality of Tambogrande issued the Municipal Ordinance Nº 012-2001-MDT-C, 
which created the consulta vecinal as a mechanism for citizenship participation at the district 
level. The ordinance was based on international treaties, national and municipal laws, 
constitutional articles regarding citizen participation and the Environment Code, setting the 
basic legal structure that would later be used in all following consultations in Peru. While 
ILO 169 was not referenced in the Tambogrande consultation ordinance – it was added in 
the following Majaz/Río Blanco municipal ordinances – it was used in activist discourses 
(Fulmer, 2011).  
The National Office of Electoral Processes initially recognised the consultation and agreed 
to provide support. However, a formal complain of unconstitutionality and illegality by the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines reduced the final involvement of the Office to advising and 
lending election materials (National Electoral Office, 2002). The technical advice of national 
and transnational groups, the financial collaboration of organization such as Oxfam and the 
observance of transnational groups (Mineral Policy Center, the Environmental Mining 
Council of British Columbia, Oxfam, Friends of the Earth from Costa Rica and Ecuador) 
were key to conducting the consultation, disseminating the experience and building the 
legitimacy of the consultation (Portugal Mendoza, 2005, Bebbington et al, 2011, (Muradian 
et al, 2003).  
On June 2, 2002, the consulta calling all district inhabitants was held and resulted in a 
massive rejection of the mining project (Portugal Mendoza, 2005). The participation 
mechanism followed the same procedures of a regular election (secret vote, registered 
voters, ballot boxes, etc). The consultation was neither recognised by the mining company 
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nor by the national government, which claimed that the EIA formal assessment was the 
legally binding decision-making process. The following month, the Frente prevented three 
public audiences by organizing protests. Finally, the public company revoked the Manhattan 
mining licence based on administrative grounds, thereby suspending the project. In 
November, 2002, the President of the Frente, Francisco Ojeda, won the Municipal elections 
(Portugal Mendoza, 2005). 
 
4.1.2 Majaz/Río Blanco conflict (Piura, Peru).  
As the Tambograde struggle was coming to an end, a new and relevant mining conflict was 
emerging nearby, in the Provinces of Ayabaca and Huancabamba (Piura Highlands), 
concerning the exploration of a copper-molybdenum mining deposit by a subsidiary of 
Monterrico Metals. The conflict of Tambogrande not only contributed to introducing mining 
scepticism in the region, but was also a source of experience and support for local groups 
and authorities in this new struggle (Diez Hurtado, 2007, Bebbington, 2012a). For instance, 
the group of organizations and individuals supporting the Frente in Tambogrande – then 
formalized as Red Muqui – fostered, later in the conflict, the formation of the Majaz Support 
Group (Bebbington, 2012a).  
The Majaz mining project was located in the peasant communities of Segunda y Cajas and 
Yanta (comunidades campesinas); lands that are administered under particular institutional 
arrangements legally recognised by the State (Bebbington, 2012a). The company did not 
comply with the required approval of the community assembly, triggering the rejection and 
formal complains of the community (Bebbington et al, 2007).  
In 2004, two “massive” mobilizations were conducted involving thousands of peasants 
concerned by the environmental (water), economic (agriculture, tourism) and social (land 
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access) impacts of the mining project and its lack of recognition of local institutions. These 
protests resulted in police clashes, injuries and the death of two peasants Remberto Herrero 
(April 2004) and Melanio García Gonzalez (July 2005) (Bebbington, 2012a). From 2004 to 
2007, local activists denounced cases of activist kidnapping, tortures and persistent 
criminalization (discredit campaigns, unjustified imprisonment, legal prosecution) that even 
reached the UK justice courts (OXFAM, 2007, 2009, Cobain, 2009). 
In 2005, mayors, local leaders and social organizations fostered the formation of the Frente 
por el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Frontera Norte del Perú (FDSFNP). The organization, 
critical of the mining project and the role of the national government, was composed by 
provincial and district government representatives, peasant communities, rondas 
campesinas, Defense Fronts from Huancabamba, Ayabaca, Tambogrande and other anti-
mining groups from the region.  
Tension and distrust rose as negotiation attempts by the regional and national governments 
were failing and the government issued measures to limit public participation rights 
(Bebbington, 2012a, Diez Hurtado, 2007, Red Muqui, 2009). In this context, a consultation 
was promoted. As in Tambogrande, the consultation was seen as a peaceful channel of 
participation that would ease local tensions. The Municipalities of Ayabaca and 
Huancabamba approved Municipal Ordinances calling for a “consulta vecinal” (Bebbington 
2012a). The consultations resulted in a 94,5% rejection to mining activities in the district. 
While in Tambogrande the national government minimised the weight of the consultation, in 
this instance it actively tried to prevent it. A vociferous campaign criminalized the 
consultation and its proponents, stating that the referendum was illegal, communist and 
politically manipulated by international NGOs that intended to delay the country's 
development (Oxfam, 2007, McGee, 2008). However, the Peruvian Ombudsman and the 
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Human Rights National council of the Minister of Justice Ministry declared that, even if this 
mechanism was non-binding, it was legal under constitutional law (Oxfam, 2009, Red 
Muqui, 2009, CISDE-ALAI, 2009). Moreover, the Majaz consultation led the National 
Ombudsman of Peru to initiate a process of regulation of indigenous consultation rights. 
What is more, both in Majaz and Tambogrande (and in Esquel, Argentina), mining activities 
were halted and therefore became examples of successful cases.    
 
4.1.3 Toquepala expansion project (Candarave), Tía María project (Islay, Arequipa) 
Kañariaco project (Lambayeque) in Peru 
After these two consultations in Piura (North of Peru), there were three other consultations 
in the south and central coast of Peru, where national organizations and networks played a 
key role in spreading the experience and providing support. The following consultation in 
Candarave (2008, Tacna region, Atacama Dessert) is different from previous cases as it took 
place in an area with ongoing large-scale mining activities. The conflict that led to the 
consultation emerged when the mining company started negotiations to expand its water use 
permits. Local and provincial governments, the irrigation users (Junta de usuarios de riego), 
and the Local Fronts of Defence opposed new permits. They pointed to the need to decrease 
mining water use due to a regional water scarcity crisis that was affecting agricultural 
production and forcing peasant out-migration, and to the need to compensate for these 
impacts. In January 2008, the mayor of Candarave called for a consulta vecinal (Municipal 
Ordinance Nº001-2008-MPC/A) with the support of the Provincial Governor, local defence 
fronts and the Junta de Aguas. The consultation had observers from national and 
international NGOs who also provided technical support (Radio Uno, 2008). Consultation 
participants (67% of eligible voters) answered two questions, 92% rejected new mining 
 21 
activities and 94% opposed to the use of underground and superficial waters for mining 
activities.  
The fourth mining consultation in Peru occurred in 2009 in the Province of Islay (Arequipa 
Department). Islay is a dry region inhabited by peasants and indigenous groups. The conflict 
emerged in 2008, with the Southern Copper Peru Corporation Tía María large-scale copper 
mine project (Gutierrez Zeballos, 2011). Concerns regarding impacts on water availability 
and local livelihoods fostered the formation of the Frente Amplio de Defensa del Medio 
Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. This movement led to the organization of a Regional Front 
with the support of local groups, the Mayor of Valdivia and national organizations such as 
the CONACAMI, Cooperacción, Red Muqui and the Coordinadora Andina de 
Organizaciones Indígenas (Gutiérrez Zeballos, 2011, Red Muqui, 2011).  
On September 27th, 2009, the six districts of Islay conducted a consulta vecinal. The 
provincial mayor refused to call for a provincial referendum. In some districts, consultations 
were called by local mayors who issued ordinances. In other districts, consultations were led 
by social movements following the same procedures (Gutiérrez Zeballos, 2011, CAOI, 
2009, Peru 21, 2009). The process was observed by a National Congressman, members of 
the Flemish NGO Broererlijk Delen, and the Peruvian NGOs Transparencia Civil and 
CONACAMI (El Búho, 2009, Márquez, 2009). With an average turnout of 48.5% 
(considering the districts where voters lists were available), 93 to 98% opposed the Tía 
María project. 
The national government did not recognize the referendum and some months later called for 
a public audience to present the project’s EIA. With the assistance of national and trans-
national organizations, around 3000 technical comments on the project’s EIA were 
submitted. Moreover, a series of regional strikes were organized as dialogue spaces were 
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perceived as sterile. These strikes were marked by hard police repression, activist 
criminalization, three deaths and more than 400 injuries (Gutiérrez Zeballos, 2011). In the 
midst of this violence, a report by the UN Office for Project Services, requested by the 
government and communities as an “independent” review, concluded that the EIA had 
serious deficiencies (UNOPS/PNUMA, 2011). These events forced the MEM to suspend the 
project.   
The fifth consultation of Perú took place in 2012 in the northern district of Kañaris (Region 
of Lambayeque). The Kañariaco mining project was a large-scale copper mine, in 
exploration stages, owned by the junior Canadian company Candente Copper Peru SA. The 
project was located in a cloud forest area inhabited and cultivated by two Quechua speaking 
communities (Municipality of Kañaris, 2012). In an assembly in 2012, the community of 
San Juan de Kañaris decided to conduct a consulta comunal (community consultation) 
(Fedepaz, 2013). The Mining Company and the MEM claimed that a consultation had 
already been conducted following the official procedures (Candente Copper, 2012).  
The community consultation followed the procedures of regular communal elections (secret, 
registered voters) without the support of local governments. The result was a 91% mining 
rejection (1,896 votes, 47.4% turn-out). The process was supported by Conacami, Red 
Muqui and leaders of local organizations and observed by the Regional Governor, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and representatives of regional offices of Development and 
Production, and Energy and Mines (Servindi, 2012).  
When this consultation occurred, the national government was promoting a law to regulate 
indigenous consultation rights. The question on whether the Kañaris are peasant or 
indigenous, hence entitled to FPIC according to ILO 169, triggered a wide debate 
(Greenspan, 2013). While the National Ombudsman and trans-national indigenous groups 
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recognise the FPIC for Kañaris, the government denies this right and claims that the 
government consultation is the valid one. In 2013, the Candente mining company stopped 
mining exploration pointing to low copper prices as the reason (No a la mina, 2013). 
 
4.1.4 Ecuador. Kimsakocha Project (Azuay)  
In October 2011, the first mining community consultation of Ecuador took place. The 
conflict arose from an open-pit project owned by a junior Canadian company. Concerns rose 
regarding the impact on water resources among indigenous and peasant groups located 
downstream from the project area (Pérez Guartambel, 2012). The idea to conduct a 
consultation emerged in the context of growing pressures from the national government to 
promote mining activities in the country, in the midst of verbal and legal de-legitimation and 
criminalization campaigns against Ecuadorian indigenous and anti-mining activists 
(interview with local activist, 2012). Moreover, local indigenous and peasant leaders were in 
contact with LA indigenous, anti-mining and Human Rights movements, in particular from 
Ecuador and Peru (interview with national anti-mining movement leader, 2012). In June 
2011, local indigenous leaders led the organization of a continental peoples meeting with 
strong emphasis on the impact of mining agendas on the environment and indigenous groups 
(Pérez Guartambel, 2012).  
A community consultation was called by the Junta de Aguas, an indigenous and peasant 
organization that administers the access to household water. The consultation was grounded 
in ILO 169, the UN Declaration on indigenous rights and the Ecuadorian Constitution (Pérez 
Guartambel, 2012). The vote was carried out in the parishes of Victoria del Portete and 
Tarqui. The organization was led by local leaders of the Federation of Indigenous and 
Peasant Organizations of the Azuay with the support of national indigenous organizations 
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(ECUARUNARI, CONAIE) and Victoria del Portete’s mayor. The consultation followed 
the Junta de Aguas election procedures: one vote per water right (a family can have more 
than one right). The vote was secret and for registered water right owners (head of family, 
not individuals). The consultation had national and international observers from 
organizations and the National Ombudsman office. Days before the consultation, newspaper 
pages and leaflets calling people not to vote were distributed. There was a 67% turnout with 
a 92.3% opposition to mining activities. Provincial and national governments did not 
recognize the vote and led a strong, discrediting campaign.   
 
4.2 Argentina 
4.2.1 Esquel project (Chubut) 
The second consultation conducted in LA took place in Esquel, in March 2003. The city of 
Esquel (28,089 inhabitants) is a main settlement of the Argentinean Patagonia, an arid 
region also inhabited by Mapuche indigenous communities. The arrival of Meridian Gold, a 
US junior mining company, with the intention to extract a gold and silver deposit located 6.5 
kilometres away from the city triggered the first mining conflict in the country.  
The use of cyanide leaching techniques and the risks of water pollution in a water-scarce 
environment stirred initial concerns. The perception that the urgency to approve the project 
was undermining the quality of the technical assessment and was excluding local concerns, 
led to the formation of a neighbours’ assembly (AVA – Asamblea de Vecinos 
Autoconvocados) opposed to the mine. The AVA brought together neighbours and 
organizations with different backgrounds, specialists in law, chemistry, medicine, 
geography, journalism and education, Mapuche groups and inhabitants of Esquel’s poorer 
areas who became key information channels to marginal areas of the city. The movement 
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deployed a wide range of strategies, from legal and administrative queries, to mobilizations, 
technical arguments and advocacy networking. As the AVA jumped scales, contacting and 
obtaining the support of regional, national and international activists, organizations and 
networks, the Esquel conflict started to be understood as part of an environmentally unjust 
process affecting many communities in LA (Urkidi and Walter, 2011, Zuoza, 2005).  
“The rejection to the mining project does not only include environmental issues (…): the 
alarm also rises from the certain release of dangerous heavy metals (cadmium, arsenic, 
mercury, etc.) to the water sources of the city and the negative and unacceptable impacts in 
health, education, safety, tourism, and we denounce that the insufficient labor generated by 
the mine requires a bachelor or an university degree (AVA Press release, January 2, 2003) 
Members of the AVA got acquainted with Tambogrande’s consultation via internet (Zuoza, 
2005). The AVA also established contacts with the Mining Policy Center (now Earthworks), 
an NGO that supported the Tambogrande consultation (Colao and Claps, 2005).  
Two representatives of the local Deliberative Council, close to the AVA, presented a 
Municipal Ordinance proposal to call for a consulta popular (popular 
consultation/referendum), using a legal mechanism present in the Provincial Constitution. 
While the proposal was initially rejected, the mounting tension in Esquel fostered its 
approval by most political parties, as a way to pacify local unrest. 
Esquel’s Mayor, who was initially reluctant, supported the consultation call based on the 
repeated mismanagement of the Provincial and National government of the conflict and 
“and a central element that has been the deep division that is growing in our community 
with very strong levels of intolerance that are undesired.” (El Oeste newspaper, February 7, 
2002). 
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A few days after the consulta popular, which resulted in a 81% rejection of the mining 
project (75% turn-out), mining activities were halted and the Chubut legislature approved a 
provincial ban on open-pit mining. The Esquel case became a national referent (Svampa and 
Antonelli, 2009, Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2010). The AVA created an online platform 
(www.noalamina.org) that is still a key source of information for Argentinean and LA 
activists nowadays. In the years that followed, as mining investments were rising, more 
social movements tried to foster similar consultations. In particular, the Government of the 
Province of Catamarca, the poorest province of Argentina where the oldest and largest mine 
operates (La Alumbrera), managed to stop at least three attempts of consultation in 
Tinogasta and Andalgalá in court. 
 
4.2.2 Lonco project (Neuquén).  
The second consultation in Argentina took place in the Municipality of Loncopue. After a 
series of legal setbacks and different intimidation campaigns aimed at social movements and 
Mapuche indigenous communities, exploration activities were advancing without permits or 
consultation procedures. A local priest got involved and brought the matter to the town, 
connecting the urban movements with rural indigenous groups. A lawyer and anti-mining 
activist from Esquel, who was living in Loncopue, transferred his professional and activist 
experience to the emerging movement, advising and supporting the legal strategy (Yappert, 
2009).  
The call for a binding referendum to approve/reject a Municipal Law forbidding large scale 
open-cast mining activities was fostered by Mapuche communities, neighbourhood 
assemblies, environmental groups and, as in Esquel, some politicians whose political parties 
were pro-mining at the provincial and national levels but who aligned themselves with anti-
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mining groups locally. With a 72% participation turn-out, 82% voted in favour of a mining 
prohibition but the Provincial Government presented a legal claim of unconstitutionality to 
disable the referendum (Yappert, 2009, Aranda, 2012). 
 
4.3 Guatemala and Colombia  
4.3.1 Sipakapa in Guatemala 
The third Latin-American bottom-up mining consultation after Tambogrande and Esquel 
(Argentina) occurred in Sipakapa (Guatemalan highlands) in June 2005. In 2003, Montana 
(now owned by the Canadian GoldCorp) got the exploitation permit for the Marlin gold 
mine in the municipalities of Sipakapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacan. These municipalities are 
inhabited by peasants who identify themselves, mostly, as indigenous (Segeplan, 2002). 
Researches and interviews underline that the first meetings held by the company with local 
groups and leaders were non-transparent, arbitrary and pro-mining (Van de Sandt, 2009, 
Urkidi, 2011). The opposition to mining in Sipakapa was born from the mistrust that arose 
in many community leaders in regard to information activities. Indigenous leaders met local 
priests and national groups (Movimiento de Trabajadores Campesinos, MadreSelva, 
CALAS) in order to get information about mining (Van de Sandt, 2009). These national 
organizations were already within LA networks (for instance MadreSelva within OilWatch) 
and distributed information on the environmental impacts of mining activities. Local leaders 
from Sipakapa visited other gold mining areas in Central America such as Valle de Siria in 
Honduras, and got in touch with regional networks against mining (e.g. Central American 
Anti-Mining Network).  
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“At first, environmentalists started this, since they were providing information. But the 
environmentalist view is not in the communities any more. Now there is the defence of life, 
which is more related to the Maya worldview (cosmovisión). (…) If we are going to have ill 
children and the whole population ill, what do we want a 10 per cent [of royalties] for? 
(…)And people have strongly appropriated this idea” (own interview to local activist, 2009) 
In December 2004, a community that blocked the passage of a truck heading to the mine in a 
neighbouring province was strongly repressed by police and military forces, resulting in the 
death of the peasant Raul Castro Bocel (Prensa Libre, 18 January 2005, Castagnino, 2006). 
The public resonance of these events forced the mayor of Sipakapa (favourable to mining) to 
arrange a public meeting to discuss the mining issue. This meeting led to a Municipality 
agreement to conduct a consultation, based on the Municipal Code and ILO 169. The idea to 
conduct a consultation had been circulating since the beginning of 2004, born from an 
Italian priest who was acquainted with the Tambogrande experience (Van de Sandt, 2009). 
The consultation was organized through the articulation of local, national and international 
organizations: the Municipal Development Council (COMUDE), the parish and its 
catechists, the Linguistic Community of Sipakapa, the local Justice of the Peace, 
MadreSelva, the National Association of Maya Lawyers, the Catholic Church of San 
Marcos, and the Indigenous Advocacy of Human Rights, among others. National and 
international observers and human right activists were called in to verify the process. The 
Guatemalan Constitutional Court rejected an appeal of Montana to ban the consultation.  
Despite boycotting strategies, 45% of the registered electorate took part in the consultation 
and 98% voted against mining. The voting was carried out in each community, some voted 
by a show of hands, while others by secret ballot. In 2007, the Guatemalan Constitutional 
Court declared that the Sipakapa consultation was valid under ILO 169 and the Municipal 
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Code, but that it was non-binding since such conventions and laws were imprecise and not 
coherent with the Constitution and also because mining activities were of national public 
interest. Hence, the municipality of Sipakapa had no authority to decide on the matter (Xiloj 
and Porras, 2008). 
The Marlin mine was in full operation from 2006 to 2014, despite the consultation and 
different legal demands in relation to environmental impacts and the violation of human 
rights1. However, the process of Sipakapa was a milestone in Guatemalan resistance against 
mining.  
4.3.2. The wave of consultations in West Guatemala and other cases 
The consulting experience has been reproduced in 56 other consultations on metal mining in 
Guatemala from 2005 to 2012 and more than 600.000 people have take part on them, 
becoming one of the most relevant political processes of recent years in the country. A 
documentary on the Sipakapa consultation (Revenga, 2005) played a central role in 
spreading the experience throughout Guatemala and Latin America. 
Fifty-two of those 57 consultations occurred in western Guatemala and most of them in the 
highlands as part of a regional campaign to reject mining activities. A regional network 
called the Western People’s Council (WPC) – where the Huehuetenango Natural Resources 
Assembly had a central role – lead this process. WPC’s main objective is to develop a 
community-based strategy against mining, where indigenous territorial rights have a central 
role. There are also national and international networks and NGOs2 supporting the 
development of the consultations. However, one key characteristic of the Guatemalan 
process is the synergies between anti-mining movements, the traditional and legally 
 
1 In 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ruled in favour of the precautionary closure of the project 
because of potentially harmful health and environmental impacts. 
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recognised sub-municipal authorities and the municipal governments in the organization of 
most consultations, and the active incorporation of local leaders in the regional network 
(Mérida and Krenmayr, 2008, 2010, Urkidi, 2011).  
 “The struggle against mining and in favor of water and life allowed us to advance more in 
the empowerment and consciousness of our communities” (own interview to WPC activist, 
2008). 
More recently, other cases of consultations that are not directly related to the WPC work are 
emerging in other areas of Guatemala, such as the consultation on the Escobal project in 
Santa Rosa, even if it was also influenced by the Sipakapa experience. The context of Santa 
Rosa differs from the highlands, as most of its population is non-indigenous. There are, 
however, some Xinca communities. The conflict arose in 2010 when Tahoe Resources and 
Goldcorp were to start a metal mine in the area that could affect a close lake and its related 
water resources. A local committee was organised and, between 2011 and 2012, four 
consultations were developed in nearby towns with the support of the regional diocese, a 
national environmental organisation (MadreSelva) and local governments. However, no 
consultation has been permitted in the town where the project is located, the mine is in 
operation, the local population is highly divided, and violent events and criminalisation 
processes have taken place over the last few years (OCMAL, 2011). 
Apart from Sipakapa and Santa Rosa, the rest of Guatemalan consultations are not 
associated with imminent mining projects but to exploration or research licences, so they 
could be understood as preventative consultations. Indeed, from 2008 to 2013, with the 
exception of the Escobal project in 2013 no new metal extraction licences were granted in 
the country. The Guatemalan government has not accepted community referendums and has 
 
2 Mainly environmental and human rights associations and NGOs from Europe and Canada (CATAPA, NISGUA or Rights 
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proposed to regulate them with a specific law (Prensa Libre 23/02/2011). However, in 2013, 
the Constitutional Court recognized, based on ILO 169 and “the unquestionable peoples’ 
right to be consulted”, the results of the Mataquescuintla consultation of 2012, considering it 
binding for the municipal government and within its competences (Expedient 4639-2012 
and 4646-2012 of the Constitutional Court). The WPC defends that the current legal 
framework is sufficient to accept the consultations and their results, and that further 
regulations would just lead to more restrictive conditions for participation (Prensa Libre 
23/02/2011, Nisgua, 2011).  
“Those consultations are an ancestral mechanism of the Maya people for participation and 
decision making. (…) We believe that our fight goes beyond a rejection of mining, we are 
starting a political and organizational platform, also on development. (…) We have an 
opportunity to promote our self-determination as indigenous people” (own interview to 
WPC activist, 2008).  
The Guatemalan anti-mining movement seeks to be inclusive in many senses, resulting in 
heterogeneous consulting processes. Mainly indigenous but also non-indigenous 
communities have been consulted (these last ones not appealing to ILO 169 but just to the 
Municipal Code), by secret ballot or by show of hands, in municipal or just communitarian 
consultas. In some cases, mainly in Huehuetenango, non-registered people have been able to 
take part in indigenous community meetings. This has lead to a greater participation of 
women than in other voting processes since women are proportionally less registered than 
men in Guatemala (Mérida and Krenmayr, 2008, 2010). Consultations have also spread to 
other extractive projects in Guatemala, such as hydroelectricity. 
 
Action among many others). 
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“Our opposition is manifested via organization, mobilization, community consultations (…) 
to have our rights respected and guaranteed, aiming to overcome the structural roots of 
economic and social inequality” (Guatemalan Western People Manifest, 2012). 
 
4.3.2 Colombia. Mandé Norte Project (Carmen de Darién, Chocó).  
Between the 24th and 28th of February, 2009, the first community consultation on mining in 
Colombia took place. The conflict started with the arrival of Muriel Mining (Río Tinto and 
other companies), and the initial consultation activities led by the government and company 
to obtain the communities’ approval to explore for copper, gold and molybdenum ores. 
Exploration sites were located in afro-descendant and indigenous people lands, including 
their homes and sacred areas, in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. Indigenous and 
afro-descendant communities started to search for information and contacted a national 
church organization working in the area. A support group was created, bringing information, 
documentaries (e.g. the Sipakapa case) and activists from other countries and communities 
to Carmen de Darién (Jahncke and Meza, 2010). Communities claimed that the official 
consultation process was not adequately conducted, excluding affected communities and 
endangering their livelihoods. As a reaction to local unrest, the national government 
militarised mining areas, intimidating and limiting community access (Jahncke and Meza, 
2010, Movice, 2012).  
Communities, inspired by the Sipakapa experience, promoted the organization as an inter-
ethnic consultation, following their own procedures (own language, registered, older than 14 
years old). Human Rights, indigenous, church and anti-mining organization representatives 
from Colombia, Paraguay, Honduras, Guatemala, Germany and Canada observed the 
process (CENSAT, 2009).  
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The consultation was grounded on international and national indigenous consultation rights, 
including the Colombian Constitution’s special consideration for indigenous consultation 
rights. The legality and legitimacy of the process was confirmed by an important verdict (T-
769, 2009) of the Colombian Constitutional Court, which led to the suspension of the 
project. Nevertheless, the year that followed campaigns to delegitimize local communities 
and further intimidation actions were conducted by the government in the area. In January 
2010, the Colombian army conducted air bombings in the area (Movice, 2012). 
Consultation attempts have also been deployed by other non-indigenous communities in 
Colombia. During the 2011, social movements in the department of Santander tried to 
conduct a popular consultation framed around the protection of water to stop gold mining 
developments in up-stream Paramo areas. This initiative was politically blocked (Comité 
por la defensa del agua y el páramo de Santurbán, 2012). Recently, in July 2013, the 
Municipality of Las Piedras (Tolima Region) conducted a popular consultation on mining 
activities, resulting in a 60% participation and 99% rejection of a large-scale mining project 
to be carried out by Anglo Gold Ashanti (EJOLT, 2013).     
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Defending livelihoods, participation and cultural recognition in contexts of 
criminalization 
The mining conflicts that led to consultations involved high-stake struggles. The contexts, 
grievances and demands fostering the mining conflicts studied in this paper are multiple and 
complex. In a special report, the Peruvian Ombudsman signalled that the increased number 
of socio-environmental conflicts related to mining in Peru derived mainly from: the justified 
fear of local communities of contamination and the negative impacts of ongoing projects 
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regarding the environment, local livelihoods, identities and social structure;,the perception 
of a continued injustice since mining activities expand in historically marginalised zones; 
the population’s mistrust of the State given the longstanding lack of environmental 
management and efficient participation mechanisms; and the excessive economic 
expectations of population (Defensor del Pueblo de Peru, 2007:5-6). These issues 
characterise well key debates that transverse LA mining conflicts and the cases addressed in 
this paper. 
As pointed by Bebbington et al (2008) and found in most of the cases studied in this 
research, the defence of livelihood is a central claim in LA mining conflicts. The studied 
communities in Peru, Guatemala, Colombia and Ecuador signal that mining activities 
jeopardize local (and supra-local) livelihoods, which are dependent on agriculture, cattle and 
forests. Indeed, in the Global South, environment-related demands tend to be associated 
with the defence of livelihoods (Muradian et al, 2003, Holden and Jacobson, 2008). This 
defence should not be understood only as the protection of a source of subsistence and 
income, but also as the protection of its embedded meanings, values and identities 
(Bebbington et al, 2008). In Latin American contentious politics, it is particularly relevant to 
draw attention to the inseparable relationship between the material and the cultural in 
livelihoods (Escobar, 2001). A struggle arising from material concerns or from the control 
of certain resources may lead to the mobilisation of meanings and cultural re-construction, 
and the other way round.  
In this sense, the misrecognition of peasant institutions and the perceived risks of mining for 
the health and the livelihood of the residents were key grievances that led to local 
mobilization in the case of Majaz (Bebbington 2012: 17). In Sipakapa, mining was framed 
as a new colonialist strategy of dispossession and was related to the historical oppressions 
and injustices lived by peasant and indigenous communities (Yagenova and Garcia, 2009, 
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Urkidi, 2011). Indeed, the majority of consultations in Guatemala have taken place in 
indigenous areas and the ethnic dimension has been central. Communities have mobilised 
and re-constructed their ethnicity in complex ways but, mainly, in relation to the defence of 
life and territory (Yagenova and Garcia, 2009:166), and are demanding greater control over 
their ancestral lands and resources.  
Moreover, as pointed out by Van de Sandt (2009), the mistrust of the consulting process 
carried out by the company and the escalating violence were the specific triggers of the 
consultation in Sipakapa. Similarly, case studies conducted in Tambogrande and Esquel 
conflicts, signalled that mistrust in official experts and institutions were key elements 
(Muradian et al, 2003, Walter and Martinez Alier, 2010). The study of Muradian et al (2003) 
on Tambogrande signalled that people mistrusted the company and the central government, 
not only because people’s perception on environmental risks differed from experts, but also 
because of a long tradition of corruption in the Peruvian society.  
A survey conducted by Muradian et al (2003) highlighted the notion of the ‘‘right’’ to 
decide local development strategies as another key issue of concern for the population of 
Tambogrande. Self-determination concerns seemed to overcome revenue increase 
considerations or low pollution scenarios. The project was seen as an ‘‘imposition’’ 
hindering local empowerment (Muradian et al, 2003). Similarly, in the consultations of 
Argentina, the right to participate in mining decisions became the center of the demands of 
the opposition. In Esquel, concerns regarding health, cyanide use and water quality and 
availability were among the main grievances that lead to the organisation of the local 
movement. However, as decision-making procedures were unable to address local 
communities’ concerns, disputes formed around these procedures and their decisions 
(Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2010, Urkidi and Walter, 2011).  
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In this sense, it is becoming increasingly common for anti-mining movements and 
communities to prevent or boycott public audiences, as these are seen as an empty requisite 
for project approval (Jahncke and Meza, 2010). There were cases of boycotts of public 
audiences in Tambogrande, Toquepala, Tía María, Esquel and Loncopue. Indigenous 
communities rejected and misrecognized the alleged consultation processes led by mining 
companies and governments in cases of consultations in Peru, Colombia and Guatemala. In 
Ecuador (Quimsacocha) and Argentina (Loncopue), indigenous communities claimed that 
formal consultation never occurred (e.g. Pérez Guartambel, 2012). The disempowering 
nature of official participation institutions that elude to engage with issues of power and 
politics fosters unrest (Hickey and Mohan, 2005:141) and may become key grievances in 
mining conflicts.  
Who has the right to decide on local development and how this affects local autonomy and 
self-determination are central matters that traverse most of the cases addressed in this paper. 
There is a clash of views regarding development and the role played by participation in this 
framework (Hickey and Mohan, 2005). Central governments sustain that mining activities 
are of national interest and that local communities shouldn’t have binding power in these 
decisions. Mining activities are framed as able to improve the wellbeing at the local and 
national levels, as long as socio-environmental risks are minimised and public income 
improved. Indeed, mining and oil rents are pushing the economic growth of some Latin 
American countries. However, affected communities wonder about the costs of this growth.  
In sum and according to our own field-work and research conducted by other authors on 
cases of consultations, we identify that concerns related to the defence of livelihood, cultural 
recognition, territorial control, participation or self-determination are central in most of the 
mining conflicts that led to consultations. Nevertheless, from our in-depth research in some 
of the cases studied, we signal that, even within a single case, there are different concerns 
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and motivations behind those actors that promote a consultation, those that support it, and 
those that vote for or against mining in the consultation3. While consultations’ promoters 
may have developed a strong anti-mining position during the conflict, consultation 
supporters and local population may not necessarily be anti-mining. As signalled in 
Tambogrande, Majaz, Esquel or Sipakapa, for instance, feelings of distrust may play a 
central role in local rejection of mining activities. Local governments can also have distinct 
motivations for supporting consultations: concerns of losing local legitimacy, escalating 
local pressure and violence, a broader project of local empowerment and recognition, an 
anti-mining position, etc. However, new research should explore in further detail the 
divergent and perhaps contradictory motives of the different groups that support or reject 
community-led consultations. 
Moreover, in some cases, we lack information on the micro-politics and there could be other 
processes and concerns that we are not identifying. For instance, it has been claimed that 
some (apparent) environmental mining conflicts are instead related to the effort of some 
actors to improve their political leverage and gain access to mining rents (Arellano Yanguas, 
2011). While we don’t discard that some of the involved actors could be defined in these 
terms, the information available for the cases addressed led us to think that, in general, these 
were not among the central collective concerns of the social movements and communities 
that led to consultations. Based on our research, we suggest that the risks of promoting a 
consultation by actors mainly interested in negotiating the terms of extraction could be too 
high. Studies conducted on Guatemalan cases show that consultations became a key event in 
the history of local communities and people perceive it as an irreversible decision, making it 
 
3 Nevertherless, Muradian et al (2003:786) pointed out that the position of the anti-mining 
stakeholders was very close to that of the majority of the population, according to a survey they 
conducted in July-August 2001. 
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politically difficult to override (fieldwork interviews 2008-2009, Trentavizi and Cahuec, 
2012). This is a hypothesis that needs to be further explored. 
One of the findings of this research has been the role played by contexts of criminalization 
and violence in the emergence of consultations. This is particularly relevant in some of the 
first cases of consultations (i.e. Tambogrande, Sipakapa, Majaz). In this line, the authors of 
this paper signal that consultations emerged as an innovative form of protest that promotes a 
democratic setting that could protect its participants. For instance, in Tambogrande the 
consultation emerged as a strategy when social movements became concerned with a 
possible escalation of violence (Cabellos and Boyd, 2007, Subies et al, 2005: 104). In 
Sipakapa, consultations were organized shortly after repression by police and military forces 
(Van de Sandt, 2009). In later cases, such as in Quimsacocha (Ecuador), the consultation 
was organized in the midst of activist and protest criminalization events that were 
discouraging public demonstrations (interview to local activist).   
Furthermore, consultations seem to have succeeded in pacifying local tensions, at least in 
the short term (i.e. in Esquel: Walter and Martinez Alier, 2010:296, in Majaz: Bebbington, 
2012a:78). Afterwards and as shown by the case of Colombia –where the community was 
air-bombed by the army one year after the consultation- violence and criminalization may 
intensify. Although the criminalization and repression of activists is not new in mining 
conflicts, the particularity of these social movements has been their ability to transform a 
risky protest environment into a democratic participation process.  
 
5.2 The diffusion of consultations through anti-mining movements’ networks  
Analyzing consultations experiences in Latin America, we identify that this institution 
emerged and was diffused hand in hand with a diversity of spatial processes.  
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Mining consultations are promoted alongside a wide range of strategies (e.g. negotiations, 
mobilisations, legal and technical allegations, dissemination activities) by social movements 
composed of a myriad of groups, including indigenous and peasants’ movements, farmers, 
(urban) professionals, local priests, the church, teachers, community leaders, national and 
international NGOs, transnational activist networks. As mining conflicts unfold, social 
movements engage with other networks and organizations (e.g. environmental, anti-mining, 
Human Rights, indigenous, Catholic) that move across multiple geographical scales. These 
networks circulate information, experiences and strategies, and promote the mobility of 
activists to learn and share experiences among communities, to LA and international forums, 
and to foreign and international tribunals.  
Among the anti-mining movements and networks driving the spread of consultations, some 
were born from the first mining consultations experiences: Tambogrande, Esquel and 
Sipakapa. Red Muqui, born from the Tambogrande conflict was a key provider of 
information, experience and materials for the Majaz/Río Blanco case and following 
consultations. The ‘Noalamina’ platform, coordinated by the Esquel anti-mining movement, 
is a central provider of information and resources for LA communities. Moreover, the fact 
that Tambogrande and Esquel consultations were perceived as successful experiences by 
national and international anti-mining movements contributed to the diffusion of the 
consulting strategy. In Guatemala, the great multiplication of mining consultations is 
partially grounded in the national and international repercussion of Sipakapa’s experience 
and in the regional networks created in Western Guatemala. This shows the relational 
character of diffusion (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005), since consultation experiences and 
mining related information have been shared through interpersonal contacts or associational 
networks in the interaction of social movements, local governments and other social actors 
(Red Muqui, 2009, Jahncke and Meza, 2010). 
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Organizations and networks have not only played a key role in spreading the experience of 
previous consultations, but have also provided logistical, technical and sometimes financial 
resources. A wide range of trans-national actors (Oxfam, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, 
the Mineral Policy Centre, Peace Brigades International, the Church, Nisgua, Catapa, Rigths 
Action or Mining Watch among others) have supported consultations as observers, 
contributing to build the international legitimacy of these processes. When considering how 
consultations have travelled among LA communities, we point out that the Internet and 
documentaries are powerful transporters of testimonies and experiences amongst distant 
people and places. While the role of the Internet has been discussed in previous studies 
(Bickerstaff and Agyeman, 2009), we also found that documentaries are significantly 
contributing to social learning. The documentaries on the Choropampa mercury spill in 
Cajamarca (Peru) and on the Tambogrande and Sipakapa consultations have been widely 
distributed in the region (Choropampa: el precio del oro, 2002; Sipakapa no se vende, 2005; 
Tambogrande: mangos, muerte, minería, 2007). An indigenous leader that led the 
consultation of Ecuador underscored the relevance of videos and documentaries to explain 
the implications of large-scale mining activities4. Colombian activists highlight how Carmen 
de Darien’s indigenous communities were inspired by the documentary on Sipakapa’s 
consultation, as this visual document showed them other indigenous groups faced with 
similar struggles, telling similar histories (interview with Colombian activist, Jahncke and 
Meza, 2010). Documentaries have shown the trans-local and structural impacts of large-
scale mining activities and the strategies of anti-mining groups, contributing to a regional 
learning process.  
As consultation experiences multiplied in LA, national and trans-national networks have 
deployed efforts to systematize and strengthen the ongoing experience and its lessons, by 
 
4 Interview conducted by Sara Latorre and Stalin Herrera with local leader, shared with the authors of this 
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organizing international events (e.g. Bi-national encounter Ecuador-Peru on Community 
Consultations, February 28, 2012) and elaborating reports (e.g. Jahncke and Meza, 2010, 
Duthie, 2012, CISDE-ALAI, 2009, Mérida and Krenmayr, 2010). National and trans-
national movements have also supported legal strategies – to defend the legality of 
consultations and condemn Human Rights abuses – at national (e.g. Constitutional Court 
case in Colombia), foreign (e.g. UK courts in the Majaz case) and international tribunals 
(e.g. Sipakapa to the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights). These processes reflect 
the two stage model of institutionalization (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008:651), where 
organizations and local governments adopt consultations as “new” structures or strategies in 
response to a local problem, which then spark processes of diffusion, systematization and 
theorization that have contributed to establish consultations as an accepted mechanism in the 
context of mining conflicts in Latin America.  
Moreover, the political power of consultations is also related to the ability of local and 
transnational actors to disseminate these events at multiple scales, creating new supports and 
sources of legitimacy. However, the emergence and spread of consultations should be seen 
as a contested process of institutionalization, where the contestation comes from some 
government bodies that reject their validity. 
As signaled in this section, mining consultation has been diffused as a key strategy through 
social movements and anti-mining networks in Latin America. However, this does not imply 
that consultation features have been transplanted from one case to the other. Indeed and as 
we develop in the next section, different contexts, regulations, institutions, and local 
customs have shaped the heterogeneity of forms that community consultations, whether 
vecinal, popular, comunitaria or inter-étnica, have adopted in LA. As pointed by Peck 




mutation – that we frame as mobility-and-hybridization – process. The key is the learning 
process, where a community sees and analyses the experience in other places, adapts, 
transforms and shapes the terms of its own consultation in a conscious and unconscious 
dynamic (Cleaver, 2003, Hickey and Mohan, 2005).  
 
5.3 Community consultations: A hybrid mechanism of participation and a political tool 
Consultations are the product of a challenging spatial grammar (Bulkeley, 2005) that 
combines the capabilities of glocal anti-mining movements and local governments5. 
Consultations can be seen as a hybrid institution that combines the formal and informal 
competences (i.e. regulation, management, communication) and different forms of power 
(e.g. legitimacy, networks, resources, trust) of social movements and local governments. 
Moreover, as we examine in this section, consultations can be seen as an institutional 
bricolage of formal and informal mechanisms embedded in a multi-scalar learning process. 
The alliance with local governments was key to build the political legitimacy of 
consultations (Red Muqui, 2009), framing them as a formal (and democratic) local 
participation institution, not a mere anti-mining social movement strategy. The fact that the 
first cases of consultations were conducted with the support of local ordinances contributed 
to establish the grounds to legitimate the following wave of consultations, conducted with or 
without this formal support (e.g. some municipalities in the Tía María consultation in Peru, 
the Kimsakocha case in Ecuador). Moreover, the involvement of social movements reduced, 
 
5
Cases of consultations conducted without alliances with local governments are the exception. In some cases, 
local governments rapidly align with social movements or even play a central role in the formation of 
movements critical of mining activities (eg. Majaz, Toquepala, Guatemala’s wave of consultations). In other 
cases, local governments change their position as conflicts unfold and finally allow or support consultations in 
order to preserve local governability or local power (eg. Esquel, Sipakapa), sometimes adopting a position that 
differs from their national political parties. 
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in some places, the distrust that many rural communities have in relation to government 
bodies, including municipalities, and increased the willingness to participate, such as in 
some Guatemalan consultations (Mérida and Krenmayr, 2008, 2010, interviews Guatemala 
2009). We could say that the legitimacy of consultations is – in part – both a cause and 
consequence of the hybrid alliances formed between local governments and social 
movements.   
The involvement of local governments in consultations reflect the heterogeneity of interests 
and values across different government bodies and the State. This singular feature of 
consultations points to the need to further problematize the role of governments in 
environmental governance frameworks. Consultations not always aim to “bypass 
governments” (Delmas and Young, 2009), but, on the contrary, to anchor part of its 
legitimacy in some of its bodies (e.g. local governments). Consultation processes show how 
the multi-scalar character of State bodies can create opportunities for initiatives born form 
the civil society (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008:659).  
In each context, consultations were legitimized by reference to local practices and/or to the 
social perception of what is the socially acceptable way of doing things (Cleaver et al, 
2013). In most cases, communities put in place hybrid procedures that combined officially 
or locally recognized participation procedures, indigenous customary rights, and lessons 
from consultations conducted in other places. For instance, in most consultations, including 
in many indigenous communities in Guatemala, the consultation followed the same 
procedures than those of a regular election: formal call to vote, registered voters, secret vote 
and the quality of the process certified by external observers. In Sipakapa, each of the 13 
communities chose its own procedure: some followed a traditional western election format, 
other voted by show of hands or other formats. However, the consultation was called by the 
Municipality and all inhabitants could vote, even non-indigenous. In Huehuetenango, non-
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registered people have also been able to vote in indigenous community meetings. The 
consultation conducted by indigenous groups in Colombia followed the example of 
Sipakapa, merging procedures. 
The  right of affected communities to participate in high-impact decisions is recognized in a 
variety of indigenous and non-indigenous, international, national and municipal norms and 
rights (Jahnchke and Meza, 2010, Fulmer, 2011).  In each context, communities strive for 
local participation appealing to, combining and reshuffling available regulations, rights and 
local traditions. For instance, communities are expanding and re-signifying, in their 
discourse and practices, the way “consultation” is framed in ILO 169 – and the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous people – forcing new debates on the 
convention’s reach (McGee, 2008, Fulmer, 2011). ILO 169 asserts that consultations should 
be conducted by States (Fulmer, 2011, Jahncke and Meza, 2010). The fact that communities 
and local governments led the process stretches the Convention’s reach. In a similar vein, 
the way in which consultations use laws that allow for local referenda in local governance 
matters (Peru, Argentina, Guatemala), challenges the national-government scale monopoly 
in mining decisions.  
In contrast with other emerging forms of (hybrid) governance that continue to exclude 
disempowered groups (Ford, 2003, Swyngedouw et al, 2002, Swyngedouw, 2005), 
consultations are organized by and take into account marginalised groups such as indigenous 
peoples, peasants and women, as illustrated by the Guatemalan case (Mérida and Krenmayr, 
2008, 2010). Consultations are a strategic tool of social movements and an emergent 
participation institution that aims to broaden the involvement and political weight of 
affected communities. The significance of community consultations is that communities are 
not only mobilizing and discursively struggling to contest mining governance, but are also 
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deploying innovative strategies to create and put in practice empowering and participatory 
institutions.  
 
5.4 Reactions, success and empowerment 
The legitimacy of consultations is in dispute by different actors, even within States and 
governments themselves. This is common in processes of institutionalization as States tend 
to intervene to ratify, redraw or reject emerging institutions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 
2008:651). While national governments and mining departments reject, ignore or 
criminalize (define as illegal acts) these participatory events, some local and provincial 
governments, as well as national and regional departments, authorities and tribunals, 
recognize this participation institution (e.g. National Electoral Office, Constitutional Court, 
Ombudsman, Human Rights National Councils, Ministry of Environment). However, the 
strength of this legitimacy grounded in the “disputed legality” of community consultations is 
also becoming a weakness. While, some LA governments (e.g. Peru, Guatemala) are 
currently formalizing consultation rights and procedures, communities are alerting about the 
related risks of co-optation, exclusion and de-naturalization.  
As cases of consultations multiplied in the region, there has been an increased effort by 
national governments and mining companies to downplay the legitimacy of this institution, 
deploying actions to discourage local participation. Nevertheless, in general terms, levels of 
participation are not low. In Sipakapa, for instance, the participation was of 45%, after flyers 
informing that the consultation was not going to occur were distributed, presumably by the 
company. However, in the national election of 2007, 60% of the registered population issued 
a vote in Guatemala, and in the Constitutional referendum of 1999, just 19%. Moreover, the 
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high percentages of votes rejecting mining in consultations reflect that a significant sector of 
society is critical to mining, giving legitimacy to this position.  
It is not evident how to judge the level of “success” of consultations as it requires a deeper 
and long-term examination of the outcomes. In some of the cases, consultations helped to 
halt mining projects in the short term (e.g. Tambogrande, Esquel, Carmen de Darién, Majaz 
to some extent, Guatemala mining development6). However, in some cases this was reverted 
in the medium/long term or activists were harshly criminalized. Communities in Colombia 
stopped the project but were then bombed by the army. In other cases, mining developments 
were not stopped, but anti-mining movements were able to expand their legitimacy at local, 
national and regional levels, accessing the media, knowledge and networks. Perhaps, the key 
success of consultations has been the political learning processes that these have triggered, 
connecting social actors, scales, places, discourses and strategies, that have allowed to 
reclaim and put in practice participation rights and to envision alternative forms of 
development. 
Activists and local leaders involved in consultations are now part of broader debates and 
networks questioning the hegemonic development views that could lead to deeper 
transformative processes (Hickey and Mohan, 2005). By challenging the governance of 
mining activities, communities are pointing out to alternative understandings of 




6 From 2008 to 2013, no new metal extraction licenses were approved in Guatemala (in 2013, the Escobal 
project and two nickel mines in Izabal were approved). Moreover, both Alvaro Colom during his presidency 
and Otto Perez Molina in 2013 declared moratoriums on the approval of mining licenses in order to establish a 
dialogue with civil society to reform the Mining Law because of conflicts and the process of consultations. 
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Analysing the cases of community consultations conducted in Latin America from 2002 to 
2012, we claim that these consultations emerged in complex struggles over livelihoods, 
recognition and participation and in the context of criminalization of local protest. 
Community consultations represent an innovative governance experience that seeks to 
ensure inclusive participation in mining conflicts. We sustain that consultations are a hybrid 
institution, the product of a dynamic multi-scalar process where non-State and State actors 
and formal and informal institutions are mobilized to challenge the centralized governance 
of extractive activities. Consultations are a strategic tool of social movements and an 
emergent participation institution that reclaims and puts in practice the right of affected 
populations and indigenous peoples to participate, in empowering forms, in high-stakes 
decisions that affect their territories, livelihoods and future.  
The analysis of a large number of cases allowed us to identify that consultations are not 
isolated experiences but constitute a strategy diffused and transformed through social 
movements and anti-mining networks. We signal a multi-scalar social learning process 
where social movements exchange experiences and discourses and a hybridising process 
occurs in relation to political and cultural local features. In this vein, we propose that there is 
an institutionalization process as consultations diffuse, hybridize and gain legitimacy in the 
context of mining conflicts. Community consultations are, however, a contested emergent 
institution, as central governments and mining companies reject these mechanisms, while 
local government and other State and government bodies support them. 
Finally, the process of consultations opens up relevant arenas for enquiry, such as why 
consultations have been promoted in some countries and not others (like Bolivia or Chile), 
or what are the medium and long-term consequences of consultations for local movements 
and their struggles. Furthermore, recently consultations/referenda are also been proposed by 
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movements opposing large-scale dams projects in Latin America (e.g. Guatemala, Brazil, 
Argentina), offering room for explorations and comparisons.  
 
References   
Aranda, D., 2012. El gobierno le hace el verso a las comunidades. Observatorio de Derechos 
Humanos de Pueblos indígenas. http://odhpi.org/2012/07/el-gobierno-le-hace-el-verso-a-
las-comunidades/ (Accessed 10 August 2013) 
Armstrong, E. and M. Bernstein (2008). Culture, Power, and Institutions: A Multi-
Institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements. Sociological Theory 26(1):74-99. 
Bakker, K. and  Bridge, G.,  2008. Regulating Resource use. In: Cox K. R., Low M, and 
Robbinson, J. (eds), Political Geography. London: Sage, 219-233. 
Bebbington, A., 2012a. Social conflict and emergent institutions. Hypotheses from Piura, 
Peru. In Bebbington, A., (Ed.) Extractive Industries, Social Conflict and Economic 
Development: Evidence from South America. Routledge, London, pp. 67-88. 
Bebbington, A., 2012b. Underground political Ecologies: The second Anual Lecture of the 
Cultural and Political Ecology Specialty Group of the Association of American 
Geographers. Geoforum 43: 1152-1162. 
Bebbington, A., Humpreys Bebbington, D., and Bury, J., 2011. Federating and Defending 
Water, Territory and Extraction in the Andes. In Boelens, R., Getches, D., Guevara, Gil., 
(Eds) Out of the Mainstream: The Politics of Water Rights and Identity in the Andes. 
London, Earthscan 307-327. 
Bebbington, A., Connarty, M., Coxshall, W., O’Shaughnessy, H., Williams, M., 2007. 
Mining and Development in Peru. With Special Reference to The Rio Blanco Project. 
Piura Peru Support Group. 
 49 
Bebbington, A., Humpreys Bebbington, D., Bury, J., Lingan, J., Muñoz, J.P. and Scurrah, 
M., 2008. Mining and Social Movements: Struggles Over Livelihood and Rural 
Territorial Development in the Andes. World Development 36 (12): 2888–2905. 
Bickerstaff, K., and Agyeman, J., 2009. Assembling justice spaces: the scalar networking of 
environmental justice in north-east England. Antipode 41 (4), 781-806. 
Bridge, G., 2004. Mapping the Bonanza: geographies of mining investment in an era of neo-
liberal reform. Professional Geographer 56 (3), 406-21 
Bulkeley, H., 2005. Reconfiguring environmental governance: Towards a politics of scale 
and networks. Political Geography 24, 875-902. 
Cabellos, E., and Boyd, S., 2007. Tambogrande: mangos, muerte, minería (Documentary). 
Guarango, Peru. 
Candente Copper, 2012. Candente Copper Provides Clarifications on Recent Community 
Consulta in Peru. 
http://www.candentecopper.com/s/NewsReleases.asp?ReportID=550822 Accessed 1 
January 2013 
CAOI (Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas), 2009. Seis distritos de la 
provincia arequipeña de Islay se pronunciaron a través del voto. 
http://elecochasqui.wordpress.com/actualidad/setiembre-2009/caoi-seis-distritos-de-la-
provincia-arequipena-de-islay-se-pronunciaron-a-traves-del-voto-rechazo-al-proyecto-
minero-tia-maria-alcanza-el-97/ (Accessed 10 January 2013) 
Castagnino, V., 2006. Metal Mining and Human Rights in Guatemala: The Marlin Mine in 
San Marcos, Guatemala. Peace Brigades International. 
Censat, 2009. Colombia: No a la Minería en territorio indígena. 
http://censat.org/component/content/article/314 (Accessed 10 January 2013) 
CISDE-ALAI, 2009. América Latina: riqueza privada, pobreza pública. CISDE-ALAI. 
 50 
Chabot, S. and J.W. Duyvendak, (2002). Globalization and transnational di¡usion between 
social movements: Reconceptualizing the dissemination of the Gandhian repertoire and 
the ‘‘coming out’’ routine. Theory and Society 31: 697-740. 
Chaparro Avila, E., 2002. Actualización de la Compilación de Leyes Mineras de Catorce 
Países de América Latina y el Caribe. UUNN División de Recursos Naturales e 
Infraestructura ECLAC. http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/6/10756/LCL1739-P-
E.pdf (Accessed 10 January 2013) 
Cleaver, F., 2001. Institutional Bricolage, Conflict and Cooperation in Usangu, Tanzania. 
IDS Bulletin, 32(4), 26–35.  
Cleaver, F., 2002. Reinventing Institutions: Bricolage and the Social Embeddedness of 
Natural Resource Management. The European Journal of Development Research, 14(2), 
11–30.  
Cleaver, F., Franks, T., Maganga, F., and Hall, K., 2013. Beyond negotiation?: Real 
governance, hybrid institutions and pastoralism in the Usangu Plains, Tanzania (No. 61). 
Working paper 61, King´s College London. 
Cobain, I., 2009. British mining company faces damages claims alter allegations of torture 
in Peru. The Guardian, 18 October 2009. 
Comité por la defensa del agua y el Páramo de Santurbán, 2012. Queja presentada ante la 
oficina del Ombudsman y asesor en materia de Observancia. http://www.aida-
americas.org/es/release/queja-interpuesta-contra-el-financiamiento-de-mina-de-oro-en-
fragiles-humedales-colombianos (Accessed 10 August 2013) 
Colao, D., and Claps, L. M., 2005. Comunicación, recursos naturales y comunidad en el 
caso Esquel. Graduate tesis Universidad de Buenos Aires. 
Cole, L.W., and Foster, S.R., 2001. From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the 
Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement. New York University Press London. 
 51 
Coumans, C. (2012) Mining, human rights and the socially responsible investment industry: 
considering community opposition to shareholder resolutions and implications of 
collaboration. Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment, 2:1, 44-63. 
De Echave, J., Diez, A., Huber, L., Revesz, B., Lanata, X. R., and Tanaka, M., 2009. 
Minería y Conflicto. social Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima 
Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú, 2007. Los conflictos socioambientales por actividades 
extractivas en el Perú. Informe Extraordinario. 
http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/modules/Downloads/informes/extraordinarios/inf_extraord
inario_04_07.pdf 
 Delmas, M. A., and Young O.R. (eds), 2009. Governance for the Environment. Cambridge 
University Press, New York.  
Diez Hurtado, A., 2007. Ronderos y alcaldes en el conflicto minero de Río Blanco en Piura, 
Perú. In: Bengoa, J., (Ed) Territorios rurales. Movimientos sociales y desarrollo territorial 
rural en América latina. RIMISP, Santiago de Chile 432-444. 
Dougherty, M. and Olsen, T, (2014). “They have good devices”: trust, mining, and the 
microsociology of environmental decision-making. Journal of Cleaner Production, 
84:183-192. 
Duthie, K., 2012. Local Votes and Mining in the Americas. Mining Watch Canada 
El Búho, 2009. Consulta vecinal en Islay sobre proyecto minero Tía María. 
http://www.elbuho.com.pe/anteriores/web392/politica3.htm (Accessed 10 August 2013) 
Ejolt, 2013. A letter from Piedras, Tolima, Colombia: local referendum against Anto Gold 
Ashanti. Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade Project. 
http://www.ejolt.org/2013/09/a-letter-from-colombia/ (Accessed 10 October 2013) 
Escobar, A. 2001: Beyond the search for a paradigm? Post-development and beyond. 
Development 43 (4). 
 52 
Escobar, A., 2008. Territories of difference: place, movements, life, redes. Duke University 
Press, Durham. 
Fedepaz, 2013. Kañaris, última comunidad de habla quechua en la costa peruana, realiza 
consulta comunal. Fundación Ecuménica para el desarrollo y la Paz. 
http://www.fedepaz.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=194&Itemid=18 
(Accessed 20 August 2013) 
Ford, L. H., 2003. Challenging global environmental governance: social movement agency 
and global civil society. Global Environmental Politics 3, 120-34 
Fulmer, A., 2011. La consulta a los pueblos indígenas y su evolución como herramienta de 
negociación política en América Latina. Los casos de Perú y Guatemala. Apuntes 68, 37-
62. 
Fulmer, A., Snodgrass Godoy, A., Neff, P. (2008). Indigenous Rights, Resistance, and the 
Law: Lessons from a Guatemalan Mine. Latin American Politics and Society, 50 (4): pp. 
91-121. 
Greenspan, E., 2013. Peru backslides on indigenous rights Oxfam America 
http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2013/05/08/peru-backslides-on-indigenous-
rights/ (Accessed 10 October 2013) 
Gerber, J.F., 2011. Conflicts over industrial tree plantations in the South: Who, how and 
why? Global Environmental Change 21 (1), 165-176. 
Givan, R.K., Soule, S.A., Roberts, K.M. (2010). The Diffusion of Social Movements: 
Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects. Cambridge University Press. 
Guatemala Western People Manifest, 2012. Manifiesto de Autoridades del Pueblo Maya de 
Occidente de Guatemala. http://www.conflictosmineros.net/contenidos/15-
guatemala/11334-manifiesto-de-autoridades-del-pueblo-maya-de-occidente-de-guatemala 
(Accessed 1 February 2014) 
 53 
Gudynas, E., 2011. Caminos para las transiciones post extractivistas. In A. Alayza and E. 
Gudynas (eds), Transiciones. Post extractivismo y alternativas al extractivismo en Peru. 
RedGE y CEPES: Lima. pp. 187-216. 
Gutiérrez Zeballos, P.J., 2011. Las razones de lucha por el valle del Tambo. In: Valle de 
Tambo-Islay. Territorio, Agua y Derechos Locales en riesgo con la minería a tajo abierto. 
Cooperacción, Red Muqui, Frente Ambito de Defensa del Valle de Tambo, 
Municipalidad Distrital de Dean Valdivia, pp 99-102. 
Haarstad, H. and Floysand, A., 2007. Globalization and the power of rescaled narratives: A 
case of opposition to mining in Tambogrande, Peru. Political Geography 26(3), 289-308. 
Hickey, S. and Mohan, G., 2005. Relocating Participation within a Radical Politics of 
Development. Development and Change 36(2): 237–262. 
Holden, W., and Jacobson, D., 2008. Civil Society Opposition to Nonferrous Metals Mining in Guatemala. 
Voluntas 19, 325–50.  
INDEC, 2002. Censo Nacional 2001. Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, Buenos 
Aires. 
Jahncke Benavente, J., and Meza, R., 2010. Derecho a la participación y a la consulta previa 
en Latinoamerica. Fedepaz Muqui Miserer CIDSE, Lima.  
Laplante, J. P. and C. Nolin (2014) Consultas and Socially Responsible Investing in 
Guatemala: A Case Study Examining Maya Perspectives on the Indigenous Right to Free, 
Prior, and Informed Consent. Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal, 
27:3, 231-248. 
Loarca, C. (2008). Las consultas de buena fe en Guatemala y la Corte Interamericana de 
derechos humanos. Albedrio: Revista electrónica de discusión y propuesta social. 
http://www.albedrio.org/htm/documentos/cloarca-001.pdf [accessed 15 January 2015] 
 54 
Márquez, N., 2009. Más del 90% de Pobladores de Cocachacra se pronunció en contra de la 
instalación extractiva y de la utilización de aguas subterráneas la Jornada de Arequipa 
journal. http://www.jornaldearequipa.com/Tambo.htm (Accessed 10 August 2013) 
Martinez-Alier. J., Healy, H., Temper, L., Walter, M., Rodriguez-Labajos, B., Gerber, J. F., 
and Conde, M., 2011. Between science and activism: Learning and teaching ecological 
economics with environmental justice organizations. Local Environment 16 (1), 17-36.  
McGee, B., 2009. The community referendum: participatory democracy and the right to 
free, prior and informed consent to development. Berkeley Journal of International Law 
27(2)  
McGee, B., 2008. An International Observer´s Account of a Local Vote in Río Blanco Peru 
Environmental Defender Law Center. http://www.edlc.org/resources/local-
votes/observers-account/ (Accessed 20 January 2013) 
Mérida, A.C., and Krenmayr, W., 2008. Informe de Sistematización de experiencias 2006-
2007. Asamblea Departamental por la Defensa de los Recursos Naturales Renovables y 
no Renovables de Huehuetenango, Guatemala 
Mérida, A.C., and Krenmayr, W., 2010. Sistematización de experiencias 2008-2009: 
Tejiendo entre los pueblos la defensa del Territorio. Asamblea Departamental por la 
Defensa de los Recursos Naturales Renovables y no Renovables de Huehuetenango, 
Guatemala. 
Movice, 2012. Pueblos indígenas y la protección del territorio. Cartografía de impulsos y 
restricciones de movimiento en el territorio. 
http://www.conlospiesporlatierra.net/?p=1543 (Accessed 10 August 2013) 
Municipal Code, 2002. Decree 12-2002: Municipal Code. Congress of the Republic of 
Guatemala, http://www.unicef.org/guatemala/spanish/CodigoMunicipal.pdf (accessed 16 
February 2010). 
 55 
Municipality of Kañaris, 2012. Datos Económicos y Sociales 
http://www.munikanaris.gob.pe/DatosDistrito.php (Accessed 20 August 2013) 
Muradian, R., Walter, M., and Martinez-Alier, J., 2012. Hegemonic transitions and global 
shifts in social metabolism: Implications for resource-rich countries. Introduction to the 
special section. Global Environmental Change 42(6), 683-695. 
Muradian, R., Martinez-Alier, J., Correa, H., 2003. International Capital Versus Local 
Population: The environmental Conflict of the Tambogrande Mining Project, Peru. 
Society and Natural Resources 16, 775-792 
National Electoral Office, 2002. Resolución RJ Nº098-2002-J/ONPE. 
http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/modResoluciones/descargas/RJN098-2002-J.pdf (Accessed 
March 2002) 
Nisgua, 2011. Comunidades rechazan iniciativa por normar las consultas comunitarias 
http://nisgua.blogspot.com.es/2011/03/comunidades-rechazan-iniciativa-por.html 
No a la mina, 2013. Minera Canadiense Candente Copper suspende actividades. 
http://www.noalamina.org/mineria-latinoamerica/mineria-peru/minera-canadiense-candente-copper-
suspende-actividades (Accessed May 2013) 
North, L. and Young, L., 2013. Generating rights for communities harmed by mining legal 
and other action. Canadian Journal of Development Studies 34(1), 96-110 
OCMAL, 2011. Cuando tiemblan los derechos: extractivismo y criminalización en América 
Latina. OCMAL-Acción Ecológica, Quito. 
Oxfam, 2007. Río Blanco: history of a mismatch in Peru. Oxfam America  
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/articles/rio-blanco-history-of-a-mismatch-in-
peru/?searchterm=majaz (Accessed 10 January 2013) 
 56 
Oxfam, 2009. Oxfam calls for an investigation of alleged torture of 28 in Peru. 
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/articles/oxfam-calls-for-an-investigation-of-alleged-
torture-of-28-in-peru (Accessed 19 January 2013) 
Peck, J. (2011). Geographies of policy: From transfer-diffusion to mobility-mutation. 
Progress in Human Geography 35(6): 773-797. 
Perez Guartambel, C., 2012. Agua u Oro. Kimsakocha la resistencia por el agua. Universidad Estatal de 
Cuenca, Ecuador 
Peru 21, 2009. Se pronunciaron contra el proyecto Tía María. Online newspaper 
(28/09/2009). Available at: http://peru21.pe/noticia/348072/se-pronunciaron-contra-
proyecto-tia-maria 
Portugal Mendoza, C., 2005. Gobernanza en el acceso a la actividad minera a los recursos 
naturales locales: el caso Tambogrande. Grupo de Investigaciones Económicas 
Radio Uno, 2008. Este viernes remitirán resultados de consulta en Candarave al ejecutivo y 
al legislativo. http://www.radiouno.pe/noticias/3963/upt_banner.swf (Accessed 10 
August 2013) 
Rasch, E.D., 2012. Transformations in Citizenship: Local Resistance against Mining 
Projects in Huehuetenango (Guatemala). Journal of Developing Societies 28(2), 159–184. 
Red Muqui, 2009. La consulta vecinal: un mecanismo de democracia directa para los 
pueblos. In America Latina: riqueza privada, pobreza pública. CIDSE-ALAI, Lima, pp. 
143-150 
Red Muqui, 2011. Valle de Tambo-Islay. Territorio, Agua y Derechos Locales en riesgo con 
la minería a tajo abierto. Red Muqui, Cooperacción, Frente de Defensa del Valle de 
Tambo, Municipalidad Distrital de Dean Valdivia, pp. 99-102. 
Revenga, A., 2005. Sipakapa NO se vende. Sipakapa qal k´o pirk´ey xik (Documentary). 
Caracol Producciones. 
 57 
Rocheleau, D., Thomas-Slayter, B., and Wangari, E., (eds), 1996. Feminist Political 
Ecology. Routledge, London 
Rodriguez Garavito, C., Morris, M, Orduz Salinas, N. and Buriticá, P., 2010. La consulta 
previa a los pueblos indígenas. Los estándares del derecho internacional. Document 2. 
Universidad de los Andes. Bogotá: Colombia. 
Rull, M., 2007. El Poder Local en América Latina en los Tiempos de la Globalización 
Neoliberal: Reflexiones sobre el Caso de Guatemala. Congress in Human Development, 
HEGOA, February 2007, Bilbao. 
Schneiberg, M. and M. Lounsbury (2008). Social Movements and Institutional Analysis. In 
R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, R. Suddaby, and K. Sahlin-Andersson (Eds.) The SAGE 
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism: 648-670. 
SEGEPLAN, 2002. Propuesta de Política para el Desarrollo Rural. Secretaría General de 
Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia SEGEPLAN, Guatemala. 
Servindi, 2012. Perú: En consulta communal el 95% de votantes de Kañaris rechazó 
proyecto minero Cañariaco. guamina.blogspot.com.es/2012/10/peru-en-consulta-
comunal-el-95-de.html 
Sieder, R. (2011) ‘Emancipation’ or ‘regulation’? Law, globalization and indigenous 
peoples’ rights in post-war Guatemala, Economy and Society 40(2): 239-265. 
Subies, T., Beltrán, M.J., Mérida, J.M., Moreno, M., Salas, I., Sánchez Corominas, A., 
Soler, M., Parea, M., 2005. El éxito de Tambogrande. Ecología política 30, 95-116 
Svampa, M., and Antonelli, A., (eds), 2009. Minería transnacional, narrativas del desarrollo 
y resistencias sociales. Biblos, Buenos Aires 
Swyngedouw, E., 2005. Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of 
Governance-beyond-the State. Urban Studies 42(11), 1991-2006. 
Swyngedouw, E., Page, B., and Kaika, M., 2002. Sustainability and Policy Innovation in a 
 58 
Multi-level Context. In Getimis, P., Heinelt, H., Kafkalas, G., Smith, R., and 
Swyngedouw, E. (Eds), Participatory Governance in Multi-level Context: Concepts and 
Experience. Leske & Budrich, Opladen, Germany. 
Tarrow, S. and D. McAdam (2005). Scale shift in transnational contention. In D. Della Porta 
and S. Tarrow (eds.) Transnational Protest and Global Activism: 121-150.  
Trentavizi, B., and Cahuec, E., 2012. Las Consultas Comunitarias de “Buena Fe” y las 
prácticas ancestrales comunitarias indígenas en Guatemala. Centro de Investigaciones 
Regionales de Mesoamérica - Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos 
de las Naciones Unidas 
UNOPS/PNUMA, 2011. Revisión “ad hoc” del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, Proyecto Tía 
María. Informe de Observaciones y Requerimiento de Información Complementaria. 
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/2122051/1296039927/name/Revisi%C3%B3n+del+Estudi
o+de+Impacto+Ambiental+del+Proyecto+T%C3%ADa+Mar%C3%ADa.pdf (Accessed 
10 January 2013) 
Urkidi, L., 2011. The defense of Community in the Anti-mining Movement of Guatemala. 
Journal of Agrarian Change 11 (4), 556-580. 
Urkidi, L., and Walter, M. 2011. Concepts of Environmental Justice in anti-gold mining 
movements in Latin-America. Geoforum 42, 683-695 
Van de Sandt, J., 2009. Mining Conflicts and Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala. Cordaid - 
University of Amsterdam, The Hague. 
Ward, T. (2011). The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples' 
Participation Rights within International Law. Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rigths, 10 (2): 54-84. 
Walter, M., and Martinez-Alier, J., 2010. How to Be Heard When Nobody Wants to Listen: 
the Esquel mining conflict. Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30 (1-2), 281-303. 
 59 
Warren, K.B., 1996. ‘Indigenous Movements as a Challenge to the Unified Social 
Movement Paradigm for Guatemala’. In Cultures of Politics/Politics of Cultures: Re-
Visioning Latin American Social Movements, eds S.E. Alvarez, E. Dagnino and A. 
Escobar, 165–95. Boulder, CO: Westview Press 
Xiloj, L., and Porras, G., 2008. Diagnóstico sobre el Derecho a la Consulta que tienen los 
Pueblos Indígenas y sus consecuencias jurídicas y políticas a partir del caso de la 
Explotación Minera en el Departamento de San Marcos. Fundación Rigoberta Menchú, 
Guatemala 
Yagenova, S. and García, R. (2009). Indigenous People's Struggles Against Transnational 
Mining Companies in Guatemala: The Sipakapa People vs GoldCorp Mining Company. 
Socialism and Democracy, 23(3):157-166. 
Yappert, S., 2009. Perdimos que pongan freno a estos proyectos de muerte. Rio Negro 
Newspaper 5/5/2009.  
Zuoza, J. A., 2005. Esquel y su No a la Mina Cronología de la lucha de un pueblo en contra 
de los abusos de poder político y económico. Chiappe, El Bolsón  
 60 
 61 
 
 
 
 
 
